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Selection in a time-periodic environment is modeled via the two-player replicator dynamics. For
sufficiently fast environmental changes, this is reduced to a multi-player replicator dynamics in a
constant environment. The two-player terms correspond to the time-averaged payoffs, while the
three and four-player terms arise from the adaptation of the morphs to their varying environment.
Such multi-player (adaptive) terms can induce a stable polymorphism. The establishment of the
polymorphism in partnership games [genetic selection] is accompanied by decreasing mean fitness
of the population.
PACS numbers: 87.23.-n, 87.23.Cc, 87.23.Kg, 02.50.Le
Environmental impact on adaptation, selection and
evolution is an important subject of biological research
[1–9]. The main scenario of environmental adaptation
on the population level is polymorphism [1–4]: two or
more clearly different types of phenotype (morph) exist
in one interbreeding population. The basic mechanisms
of polymorphism are heterozygote advantage and inho-
mogeneous (frequency, space and/or time-dependent) en-
vironment [2, 4]. Polymorphism can be restricted to the
phenotype level, or it may be controlled genetically by
multiple alleles at a single locus , e.g., human ABO blood
groups [4]. Here is one example of polymorphism related
to a time-dependent environment [4, 5]. Forrest popula-
tions of the land snail Cepaea Nemoralis consist of three
morphs having respectively brown, pink and yellow col-
ored shells [4, 5]. The brown and pink morphs have an
advantage over the yellow morph at the spring time, since
the background color makes them less visible for preda-
tors [4, 5]; the yellow morph has an advantage at summer
and autumn on the yellow-green substrate. In addition,
the yellow morph is more resistant to high and low tem-
peratures [4, 5]. Thus different morphs have different
advantage under different environmental conditions [4].
A varying environment has roughly three dimensions:
it may be time or/and space dependent, predictable vs
stochastic, and fine vs coarse-grained [1]. The latter
means that each individual within population sees mainly
one fixed environment, which can change from one gen-
eration to another, for example. A fine grained environ-
ment changes many times during the life-time of each
individual; see the above example of Cepaea and note
that this snail lives seven to eight years [4, 5].
Much attention was devoted to modeling polymor-
phism in various coarse-grained environments [1, 2, 6–
9]. Fine-grained environments got less attention, since
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early theoretical results [1, 10] and the biological common
sense [2] implied that non-trivial polymorphism scenarios
are absent. One expects that in this case the organism
sees (thus adapts to) the average environment [1, 2, 10].
However, recent experiments indicate that the evolving
populations can adapt to time-varying aspects of their
fine-grained environment [11–13]. In particular, they can
respond to the environmental patterns other than the en-
vironmental mean [11]. Moreover, the total fitness dur-
ing such an adaptation need not increase [13]. A proper
theoretical model for such phenomena is still absent.
Here we present a theory for polymorphism in fine-
grained, time-periodic environment based on Evolution-
ary Game Theory (EGT). Our main method is the time-
scale separation in the replicator dynamics.
EGT describes interacting agents separated into sev-
eral groups [7, 14]. The reproduction of each group is
governed by its fitness, which depends on interactions
between the groups. The most popular replicator dy-
namics approach to EGT describes the time-dependent
frequency pk(t) of the group k, which is the number of
agents Nk in the group k, over the total number of agents
in all n groups: pk = Nk/
∑n
k=1Nk. The fitness fk of the
group k is a linear function of the frequencies [7, 14]:
fk(a, p) =
∑n
l=1
aklpl, k = 1, . . . , n, (1)
where the payoffs akl account for the interaction between
(the agents from) groups k and l. The replicator dynam-
ics [14] facilitates the (relative) growth of groups with
fitness larger than the average fitness
∑n
l=1plfl:
p˙k = pk[ fk(a, p)−
∑n
l=1
plfl ] ≡ Gk[a, p]. (2)
Within game theory the groups correspond to strategies,
while the pay-offs akl describe interaction between two
players: the probability pk of strategy k changes accord-
ing to the average pay-off
∑
l aklpl received by one player
in response to applying the strategy k [7, 14].
2There are several applications of EGT and replicator
dynamics in biology: i) Animal (agent) contests, where
the groups correspond to the strategies of agent’s be-
havior during the contest, while pk is the probability by
which an agent applies the strategy k [14]. The actual
mechanism by which pk changes depends on the concrete
implementation of the model (inheritance, learning, imi-
tation, infection, etc). ii) Selection of genes, where pk is
the frequency of one-locus allele k in panmictic, asexual,
diploid population, and where akl = alk refers to the se-
lective value of the phenotype driven by the zygote (kl)
[7]. Then (1, 2) are the Fisher equations for the selec-
tion with overlapping generations [7, 14]. iii) The basic
Lotka-Volterra equations of ecological dynamics can be
recast in the form (2) and studied as replicators [14].
Within the replicator approach polymorphism means a
stable state, where two or more pk are non-zero.
We consider a varying, but predictable environment,
which acts on the phenotypes making akl periodic func-
tions of time with period 2π/ω [7, 15]: akl(τ) = akl(τ +
2π), τ ≡ ωt. There are well-defined methods to decide
to which extent a varying environment is predictable for a
given organism [9]. The oscillating payoffs can reflect the
fact that different morphs (alleles, strategies) are dom-
inating at different times. Let us assume that the en-
vironment varies fast [fine-graining]: the average change
of the population structure over the environment period
2π/ω is small. We separate the time-dependent payoffs
akl(τ) into the constant part a¯kl and the oscillating part
a˜kl(τ) with zero time-average ¯˜akl ≡
∫ 2pi
0
dτ
2pi a˜kl(τ) = 0,
akl(τ) = a¯kl + a˜kl(τ), ∂τ aˆkl(τ) = a˜kl(τ), aˆkl = 0, (3)
where aˆkl is defined to be the primitive of a˜kl with its
time-average equal to zero.
Following the Kapitza method [17], we represent pk as
a slowly varying part p¯k plus ǫk[p¯(t), τ ], which is smaller
than p¯k, fast oscillating on the environment time τ , and
averaging to zero:
pk(t) = p¯k(t) + ǫk[p¯(t), τ ], (4)
ǫ¯k[p¯(t)] =
∫ 2pi
0
dτ
2π
ǫk[p¯(t), τ ] = 0. (5)
Here the average is taken over the fast time τ for a fixed
slow time t. Note that the fast ǫk depends on the slow p¯.
Now put (4) into (2) and expand the RHS of (2) over ǫ:
˙¯pk + ˙¯pα∂αǫk + ω∂τ ǫk = [1 + ǫα∂α +O(ǫ
2)]Gk[a˜(τ), p¯],(6)
where the summation over the repeated Greek indices, is
assumed and ∂αX ≡
∂
∂p¯α
X . The fast factor ǫi is searched
for via expanding over 1
ω
: ǫk =
1
ω
ǫk,1+
1
ω2
ǫk,2+ . . .. Sub-
stitute this into (6), add and subtract suitable averages,
and get for the fast terms: ∂τ ǫk,1 = Gk[a˜(τ), p¯] +O(
1
ω
).
After straightforward integration, we have
ǫk[p¯(t), τ ] =
1
ω
Gk[aˆ(τ), p¯(t)] +O(
1
ω2
), (7)
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FIG. 1: Schematic portrait of (15) for C = 0 [upper diagram]
and for C satisfying conditions (17) [lower diagram]. Stable
[unstable] fixed points are denoted by circles [squares]. Ar-
rows indicate direction of flow in time.
where aˆ = {aˆkl} is defined in (3). Once (7) is separated,
the remainder in (6) is the evolution of slow terms
˙¯pk = Gk[a¯, p¯] + ǫα[p¯, τ ] ∂αGk[a˜(τ), p¯] +O(1/ω
2), (8)
where the time-average is defined as in (5). Working out
(8) and using aˆb˜ = −a˜bˆ we get again a replicator equation
˙¯pk = p¯k [Fk(p¯)− p¯αFα(p¯)] , (9)
Fk(p¯) = a¯kαp¯α + bkαβ p¯αp¯β + ckαβγ p¯αp¯β p¯γ (10)
where Fk is the effective (already non-linear) fitness, and
bklm ≡
1
ω
a˜kl aˆlm, cklmn ≡
1
ω
aˆkl a˜
[s]
mn. (11)
Here we defined a
[s]
kl ≡
1
2 (akl + alk). Equations (9, 10)
are our central result. Expectedly, the fast environment
contributes the averaged payoffs a¯kl into Fk. This is well-
known for any fine-grained environment [1].
However, besides this averaged two-party interaction,
each group k gets engaged into three- and four-party in-
teractions with payoffs bklm and cklmn, respectively. In-
deed, recalling our discussion after (2), we can interpret∑
lm bklmp¯lp¯m in (10) as the average pay-off received by
one of three players upon applying strategy k. The terms
with bklm and cklmn in (10) exist due to adaptation of
the morphs to their environment: while the frequencies
of the morphs fast oscillate on the environmental time,
see (5), on longer times the population sees the fast en-
vironment as an effective many-player model. Note that
the terms with bklm and cklmn need not be small as com-
pared to a¯kl-terms, since the derivation of (9–11) applies
for p¯k ≫ ǫk, which can hold even for a¯kl → 0.
We get bklm = cklmn = 0 [due to aˆkla˜kl = 0], if only one
akl varies in time, or if all a˜kl oscillate at one phase: a˜kl =
a(t)ξkl, where ξkl are constant amplitudes. Indeed, the
adaptive terms [with bklm and cklmn] are non-zero due to
interference between the environmental oscillations of a˜kl
and those of ǫk, which are delayed over the environmental
oscillations by phase π/2; see (7). This is why there is no
interference if all a˜kl oscillate in phase. Thus for having
the adaptive terms we need at least two morphs reacting
on the environment differently, e.g., due to different delay
times of reaction. For the adaptive terms we also need
3the frequency-dependent selection, e.g., they are absent
for haploid replicators p˙k = pk[ak(t)− aα(t)pα].
Euation (9) implies that the relative growth of two
morphs at slow (long) times is determined by the ef-
fective fitness difference: ddt (p¯k/p¯l) = (p¯k/p¯l)(Fk − Fl).
Thus in the stable fixed points of (9) the (effective) fit-
ness of surviving morphs are equal to each other, while
the fitness of non-surviving (p¯k → 0) morphs is smaller
(Nash equilibrium) [14]. Another pertinent quantity, the
(fast) time-averaged fitness f¯k[p(t)] is the cumulative ef-
fect of the short-time replication intensities. Employing
(4, 5, 7) we deduce that even when the adaptive terms
are taken into account, these two quantities are equal
Fk = fk(a¯+ a˜, p¯+ ǫ). The overall long-time fitness of the
population is characterized by the effective mean fitness
p¯αFα, which is also equal to its time-averaged analog:
Φ ≡ (p¯α + ǫα)(a¯αβ + a˜αβ)(p¯β + ǫβ) = p¯αFα
= a¯αβ p¯αp¯β + bαβγ p¯αp¯β p¯γ . (12)
The contribution cαβγδp¯αp¯β p¯γ p¯δ in p¯αFα nullifies due to
(11) and aˆb˜ = −a˜bˆ.
The mean fitness Φ is especially important for part-
nership games [genetic selection]: aik(τ) = aki(τ), since
for the constant payoff situation in the replicator equa-
tion (2), Φ monotonically increases towards its nearest
local maximum over the set of variables p¯k (fundamen-
tal theorem of natural selection) [7, 14]. As follows from
(11, 12), for aik(τ) = aki(τ), Φ reduces to the averaged
two-player contribution: Φ =
∑
αβ p¯α a¯αβ p¯β . However,
the theorem is not valid in the presence of the adaptive
terms, and the mean fitness can decrease; see below.
Let us now study concrete examples. For n = 2, Eq. (2)
simplifies to a closed equation for the frequency p1
p˙1 = p1(1− p1)[A(t) −B(t)p1], (13)
A(t) ≡ a12(t)− a22(t), B(t) ≡ 2a12(t)− a11(t)− a22(t),
where without much loss of generality we adopted
a12(τ) = a21(τ). Using notations (3) and defining
C ≡
1
ω
Aˆ B˜ =
1
ω
[ aˆ12 (a˜22 − a˜11) + aˆ22 a˜11 ], (14)
for the adaptive factor, we deduce from (7, 8, 13)
˙¯p1 = p¯1(1− p¯1)[A¯− B¯p¯1 − Cp¯1(1− p¯1)]. (15)
C vanishes for the symmetric homozygotes, a11(τ) =
a22(τ), and for one recessive allele, e.g. a12(τ) = a22(τ).
Both cases are easily solvable from (13) showing that the
long-time behavior of p1 is indeed governed by A¯.
The vertices p¯1 = 1 and p¯1 = 0 are always fixed points
of (15), while two interior fixed points are
π1,2 =
1
2C
[B¯ + C ∓
√
(B¯ + C)2 − 4A¯C ], π1 < π2.(16)
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FIG. 2: The portrait of (18) for a¯12 = 0.1, a¯13 = 0.1,
a¯23 = −0.1, κ1 = −0.65 and κ2 = 0.65; p¯1 and p¯2 are re-
stricted by 0 ≤ p¯1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ p¯2 ≤ 1, p¯1 + p¯2 ≤ 1. Two
fixed points are denoted by square (saddle) and cycle (cen-
ter). The closed orbits contain the center in their interior;
orbits from the second class converge to p¯1 = 1. These two
classes of orbits are separated by a dashed curve (separatrix),
which is made by joining together two unstable directions of
the saddle. Arrows indicate direction of flow.
If π1 and π2 are in (0, 1), then π1 (π2) is stable (unstable).
The analysis of (15) reduces to the following scenarios.
1. For A¯ > 0 and A¯ > B¯ [i.e., a¯11 > a¯12 > a¯22] the
morph 1 globally dominates for C = 0, i.e., for all initial
conditions p¯1 goes to 1 for large times; see Fig. 1. The
global dominance does not change for C < 0. One can
call this morph generalist [2], since its fitness does not
oscillate in time (ǫk in (7) is zero for p¯1 = 1), and its
fitness is maximal; see also below. For
C > B¯ > 0 and (B¯ + C)2 ≥ 4A¯C, (17)
both π1 and π2 fall into the interval (0, 1), see Fig. 1,
while if one of conditions (17) does not hold, both π1
and π2 are not in this interval. Thus if (17) hold, a stable
fixed point π1 emerges, which attracts all the trajectories
that start from p¯1(0) < π2: the polymorphism is created
by the adaptation term ∝ C in (15). Initial condition
larger than the unstable fixed point π2, p¯1(0) > π2, still
tend to p¯1 = 1; see Fig. 1. Both stable fixed points
π1 and 1 are Evolutionary Stable States (ESS), mean-
ing that they cannot be invaded by a sufficiently small
mutant population [14]. The coexistence of two ESS one
of which is interior (i.e., polymorphic) is impossible for
a two-player replicator equation with constant pay-offs
[14], but it is possible for multi-player replicator equa-
tion [16]. We thus saw above an example of this behavior
induced by time-varying environment.
As we discussed below (12), the mean fitness does not
contain the adaptive terms directly and is given as Φ =
2A¯p¯1 − B¯p¯
2
1 (up to an irrelevant constant). For A¯ > 0
and A¯ > B¯, Φ maximizes at p¯1 = 1, and this maximum
is the only stable fixed point of the replicator dynamics
(15) with C = 0. If however C satisfies conditions (17),
in the stable fixed point p¯1 = π1 the mean fitness Φ is
smaller than at the stable point p¯1 = 1. Moreover, for
the initial conditions π1 < p¯1(0) < π2, the mean fitness
Φ decreases in the course of the relaxation to π1.
4The quantity which is increased by dynamics (15) is
Ψ = 2A¯p¯1 − B¯p¯
2
1 − Cp¯
2
1(1 −
2p¯1
3
) = Φ− Cp¯21(1−
2p¯1
3
).
Thus Ψ is the Lyapunov function: Ψ˙ ≥ 0. Though
Ψ − Φ < 0 whenever the adaptive polymorphism con-
ditions (17) hold, the difference between the Lyapunov
function and the mean fitness is not negative for C < 0.
Compare these facts to the evolution in a coarse-grained
environment, which tends to maximize the average fitness
minus a positive risk aversion factor; see [18] for reviews.
2. For B¯ > A¯ > 0 [i.e., a¯12 > a¯11, a¯22] and C = 0 there
is a stable polymorphism at the fixed point p¯1 = A¯/B¯
(heterozygote advantage). The presence of C 6= 0 in (15)
does not change this polymorphism; only the value of the
fixed point shifts to π1. In contrast to the scenario 1, here
the response to slow environmental changes is reversible.
3. For B¯ < A¯ < 0 and C = 0 there is an unstable
polymorphism: all the initial conditions with p¯1(0) <
A¯/B¯ end up at p1 = 0 (morph 2 dominates), while those
with p1(0) > A¯/B¯ finish at p1 = 1 (morph 1 dominates).
Now C 6= 0 in (15) shifts the unstable fixed point to π2.
These are all possible scenarios for n = 2; other rela-
tions between A¯ and B¯ lead to interchanging morphs.
For three morphs, n = 3, we assume the zero-sum sit-
uation in (2), akl(τ) = −alk(τ) [19]: the loss of the strat-
egy l is equal to the gain of k. Equations (9–11) reduce
to
˙¯pi = p¯ia¯iαp¯α + κip¯1p¯2p¯3, κ1 = 2b123, κ2 = 2b213, (18)
where
∑3
i=1 κi = 0. The four-party contribution disap-
pears from (18). One can show that any interior fixed
point of (18) can be either saddle (two real eigenvalues
of the Jacobian with different sign) or center (two imag-
inary, complex conjugate eigenvalues).
4. For a¯12 > 0, a¯13 > 0 and κi = 0 the morph 1
globally dominates: p¯1 = 1 is the only stable fixed point.
For the existence of polymorphism it is necessary that
κ1 < 0, i.e., the strategies 2 and 3 together win over 1,
although separately they lose to 1. The dominance of 1 is
still kept when p¯2 or p¯3 are forced to decay, because then
the adaptive term in (18) is irrelevant for sufficiently large
times. This happens when a¯23 < 0 and κ2 < 0 or when
a¯23 > 0 and κ3 < 0. Apart from these cases the terms ∝
κi in (18) can lead to polymorphism, provided that their
magnitude is large enough; see Fig. 2. Besides the stable
fixed point p¯1 = 1 of the κi = 0 dynamics, two new fixed
points emerge: stable (center) and unstable (saddle). A
domain around the saddle supports polymorphism with
cyclic dominance of the morphs; see Fig. 2. We see a
general feature of all the above examples: the adaptive
(multi-party) terms do not influence the local stability of
the vertices (where all but one p¯k’s are zero).
5. For a¯12 > 0, a¯13 < 0, a¯23 > 0 there is polymor-
phism already for κi = 0: 1 wins over 2, which wins over
3, but 3 wins over 1 (rock-scissor-paper game). Now for
κi = 0 in (18) there is already one interior fixed point,
and the trajectories are closed orbits around this fixed
point. After including the adaptive (∝ κk) terms in (18)
this fixed point is simply shifted, and no new fixed points
appear for any size or magnitude of κi.
To summarize, we have shown that in addition to the
averaged payoffs, a fast [fine-grained] time-periodic en-
vironment generates adaptive, multi-player terms in the
replicator dynamics, provided that at least two morphs
react on the environment differently. These terms can
create a polymorphic stable state via adaptation of the
“weak” morphs to environmental changes. This polymor-
phism is related to decreasing mean fitness of the pop-
ulation. This specific aspect of the polymorphism was
argued to be a prerequisite for the phenomenon of sym-
patric speciation, where by contrast to the allopatric sce-
nario the speciation is induced inside a single population
[20]. Thus, our results hint at a sympatric speciation sce-
nario due to a fine-grained, time-periodic environment.
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